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ABSTRACT
Our daily life applications have come to depend on communication 
networks to deliver services in an efficient manner. This has 
made it possible for an attacker to sabotage its operation. 
Network resiliency is concerned with the degree the network is 
able to bounce back to a normal operation in the face of attacks. 
This paper introduced a new resiliency measure, called Level-
of-Resilience (LoR) for communication networks, determined 
by examining: (a) the Level-of-Stability-Reduction (LoSR), as 
measured by percentage of “IP traffic dropped”, (b) the eventual 
Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR), as captured by the 
percentage of reduction in the application Quality-of-Service 
(QoS), namely latency and (c) Recovery-Time (RT), which is the 
time the network takes to detect and recover from an attack or a 
fault, as measured by convergence duration. Previous resiliency 
measures may only consider one aspect of the above parameters, 
while this measure is a composite of them. This paper showed that 
network topology can affect the network resilience, as indicated 
by the LoR metric. This measure is illustrated by comparing the 
resiliency level of two communication networks that served the 
same traffic, but differed in their network topology, under three 
different attack scenarios.
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INTRODUCTION
An adverse event can affect both networks’ stability and performance, and 
whose recovery time is also another important figure of merit. Therefore, 
when designing a network, it is crucial to choose the best design utilizing the 
given set of resources (of nodes and connectivity). Doing so, can affect the 
network’s resiliency, i.e. its ability to withstand adverse events. Hence, this 
paper tackled the problem of measuring how resilient the network is against 
adverse events (link, or node failures). 
   
Various measures of networks’ resilience have been investigated throughout 
the literature. For instance, Farid (2015) proposed static resilience measures 
(number of service paths that realized a service, before and after a disruption) 
for large flexible engineering systems based upon an axiomatic design model 
which specifically considered the allocation of the system processes to system 
resources. Such processes and resources may be defined at any level of 
abstraction or decomposition at successive stages of the engineering design.
   Menth, Duelli, Martin, and Milbrandt (2009) assigned reasonable probabilities 
to failure scenarios, abnormal traffic matrices of the network for ingress-egress 
pairs and to overload on links. Then statistical measures for unavailability 
and overload in the network are derived. Baroud, Ramirez-Marquez, Barker, 
and Rocco (2014) introduced stochastic temporal metrics of resilience against 
a disrupted network. These are time to total system restoration, time to full 
system service resilience, and time to a specific %α resilience. 
The network resilience measure is given by Shi & Fonseka (1997) as the 
percentage of lost traffic due to physical link failures. The scalability of 
network resilience is defined as the growth rate of this measure with respect to 
the physical topology, the failure probabilities, the protection schemes and the 
network layer traffic (Liu & Ji, 2009).
The integration of the area under the quality curve with values representing 
varying degrees of system operability is labeled with Resilience R by O’Rourke 
(2007). Moreover, the expected loss in the quality of communications, 
as modeled by a random variable, is proposed by Shirazi et al. (2013) as a 
resilience measure. The quality measure can be in terms of bandwidth, latency, 
throughput, or some other observable variables of interest, when the adversary 
takes out a number of nodes.
A series of experiments were conducted by CAIDA (2016) to infer topological 
resilience of complex networks to breakdowns or attacks, by estimating the 
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percentage of the network that remains reachable when nodes with the largest 
out-degrees are removed, or by removing nodes with the smallest average 
distance to the rest of the network. A similar resilience measure is introduced 
by Matta (2014), namely Vertex Attack Tolerance (VAT). VAT represents the 
worst case scenario of the proportionally smallest number of vertices that 
must be attacked in order to disconnect the largest number of vertices from 
the network.
A comprehensive set of network characteristic parameters that affect the 
performance and the resilience of the network were identified by Mohammad, 
Hutchison, and Sterbenz (2006). These parameters were classified by density, 
mobility, channel, node resources, network traffic, and derived properties. 
A network metric is a function of these parameters. Then, mathematical 
expressions are defined for network states in terms of network operational 
metric (e.g. normal operation, partially degraded, and severely degraded), 
and also in terms of network performance (e.g. acceptable, impaired and 
unacceptable).
A two-dimensional classification framework for network resilience metrics 
was presented by ENISA (2010). The first dimension was incidence-based 
classification, where resilience metrics were grouped over three different 
times: the preparedness phase, the service delivery phase, and the recovery 
phase. The second dimension was domain-based classification, covering 
areas such as security, dependability and performability. In the preparedness 
phase, the number of links removed are varied, while measuring the network 
performance (e.g. bandwidth, packet loss) either empirically or via simulation. 
Using the data collected, an envelope were determined, which was confined 
by the best case curve (the upper boundary of the performance) and the worst 
case curve (the lower boundary of the performance) for a given number of 
link/node failures. 
A quantitative framework based on using a measure analogous to availability 
through the dependence on the up and down times was proposed by Kwasinski 
(2015) for measuring and characterizing resiliency for communication 
networks power supply. The degree of dependency
of a communications facility from the electric power grid or of components 
of a communications site could be measured based on a primary dependent 
resiliency RL.
Heck, Kieselmann and Wacker (2016) measured the network connectivity 
within extensive simulations for different structured overlay network 
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configurations to determine the resilience of self-organizing cyber-physical 
systems. The network resilience r is given by the number of nodes that can fail 
without loss of communication.
Conceptual frameworks for performance testing and network optimization that 
would enable operators in Thailand to optimize their network performance 
was developed by Chimmanee & Jantavongso (2016). This involved the QoS 
measurements of the services (e.g. latency, user data rates, and speed test 
measurements) by the 3G operators and on 850/900MHz and 2100MHz bands 
respectively. 
The main contribution in this paper is to introduce the notion of Level-of-
Resilience (LoR) for communication networks as a way to measure their 
resiliency. To quantify resiliency, the following are considered: (a) Level-
of-Stability-Reduction (LoSR), as measured in terms of the percentage of IP 
traffic dropped, (b) Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR), as measured in 
terms of percentage of reduction in the application Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
latency parameter, and (c) the amount of Recovery-Time (RT) it takes for a 
network to recover from an adverse event in terms of convergence duration. 
Two communication networks with the same users and applications, but with 
different topologies were analyzed using the Optimized Network Engineering 
Tools (Opnet Modeler), a software tool for computer network modeling and 
simulation (RTI, 2016). The collected data from the simulation were used to 
compare the Level-of-Resilience for these two networks under three different 
attack scenarios. 
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS LEVEL-OF-RESILIENCE  
Communication Networks Stability  
Traditionally, networks have been viewed as being a relatively stable layer 
over which traffic is routed. The traffic flows and the routing updates have 
been seen as sources of instability (Clayman, Clegg, Galis, & Manzalini, 
2012). The level of path stability defined by Kuipers & Van Mieghem (2005), 
has a direct relation to the number of updates that are necessary to maintain 
an accurate view of the network state of information. If a small change in the 
network state does not affect the shortest path between network nodes, then 
such a change need not be distributed throughout the network. 
Stability refers to the property of keeping the amount of traffic (number of 
packets) in the network to remain always bounded over time (Alvarez, Blesa, 
& Serna, 2011). Beyond such a bound, a network would incur packet drops/
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losses, and therefore, the level of stability of a network is measured in terms 
of the percentage of IP traffic dropped.
The attack model presented here includes link or node failures (the latter also 
implies a set of link failures). Certainly a network must be endowed with 
layers of security (such as authentication, encryption, firewalls and detection) 
to cope with false/corrupted traffic, but those are viewed to be the resiliency 
properties of the security layer, and the network resilience is viewed to arise 
out of its topological and networking redundancy in coping with link/node 
compromises (Salles & Jr, 2011). This work examined the network resilience 
against link failures in terms of losses in level of stability and performance (i.e. 
the application latency QoS parameter) while recovery time as measured 
by convergence duration was another figure of merit.
Level-of-Resilience Formulation
Given a sequence of m faults/attacks, and the corresponding rerouting/
recovery actions, suppose the resulting network configurations (also referred 
to here as modes) are denoted by N0 → N1 → …→ Nm, where N0 is the initial 
mode, while Ni is the mode after the i
th fault and reconfiguration (i=1, …, m). 
The amount of IP traffic dropped in those configurations is denoted as: IP0 → 
IP1 → … → IPm. Then, as mentioned above, the Level-of-Stability-Reduction 
(LoSR) is measured by the percentage of IP traffic dropped. 
Definition 1. Given the sequence of mode switches: N0 → N1 → …→ Nm, 
(under an attack scenario A), the corresponding sequence of amount of IP 
traffic dropped: IP0 → IP1 → … → IPm,, and the total amount of IP traffic 
sent, IPs, the Level-of-Stability-Reduction, LoSR, is given by, 
LoSR := [(IPm – IP0)/ IPs ]%.                          (1)
For the following definition, a factor is added, which is the Level-of-
Performance-Reduction (LoPR) in the application Quality-of-Service (QoS), 
namely network latency.
Definition 2. Given the sequence of mode switches: N0 → N1 → …→ Nm, 
(under an attack scenario A), the Level-of-Performance-Reduction, LoPR, in 
the Quality-of-Service, QoS, Latency parameter, L, of a network application, 
is given by Maximum-Loss-in-Performance, MLiP:
LoPR :=[(Lm  – L0) / L0 ]%.                             (2)
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Another aspect of the resiliency metric is Recovery-Time (RT), which is the 
time network takes to detect and recover from an attack or a fault, as measured 
by convergence duration. This duration tells how much time it takes for a 
network that goes to failure condition to come back to normal condition (Shah 
& Waqas, 2013).
Using Definitions 1 and 2, the following definition can be used to compare 
the Level-of-Resilience of two or more networks under an attack scenario: A 
network is more resilient if it incurs a smaller loss of stability, or otherwise, 
a smaller loss of performance, or otherwise a smaller level of recovery-time.
Definition 3. Given two networks CN1 and CN2, and an attack scenario A, we 
say that LoR(CN1, A) > LoR(CN2, A) if:
[LoSR(CN1, A) < LoSR(CN2, A)]
Ú [[LoSR(CN1, A) = LoSR(CN2, A)]
     Ù [LoPR(CN1, A) < LoPR(CN2, A)]]
Ú [[LoSR(CN1, A) = LoSR(CN2, A)] 
    Ù [LoPR(CN1, A) = LoPR(CN2, A)] 
    Ù [RT(CN1, A) < RT(CN2, A)]].
Example Networks to Illustrate LoR 
To illustrate this approach, a pair of communication networks with identical 
users and applications/services (Email, FTP, and Video) were considered, 
but with different topologies, as shown in Figures 1 (a) and (b). For the 1st 
communication network, CN1, three routers; R1, R2, and R3 were configured 
with Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and were connected with each other. 
In addition to that, R1 was connected to three Local Area Networks (LANs); 
LAN1, LAN2, and LAN3, where each LAN had ten users. R2 was connected to 
LAN4, which had ten users as well. Router R3 had three more links, which 
connected it respectively, to an Email server through the Internet, an FTP 
server, and a Video workstation. The 2nd communication network, CN2, had 
the same users and applications/services as CN1, but possessed a different 
topology, in which LAN1 was connected to R3 as opposed to R1.
The application configurations, the node models in use, and link models in use 
for the two networks are tabulated in Appendix, Tables 10-12. For Email and 
FTP services, the latency corresponded to the download time, whereas for the 
Video application, it was measured as the packet delay variation. This work 
demonstrates through analysis that while the two networks served the same set 
of users/demands, and were served by the same set of servers/workstations, 
they had different resilience to the same attack due to their topological 
difference.
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Figure 1. (a) Network CN1, and (b) Network CN2. 
EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF LoR
In this section, three different attack scenarios for two different communication 
networks CN1 (Figure 1 (a)) and CN2 (Figure 1 (b)) were simulated, with 
identical users, and applications/services (Email, FTP, and Video), but 
with different topologies. For each scenario, the LoR for each network was 
evaluated and compared.
In the first attack scenario A1, two links were compromised in the sequence: 
L13 → L23. For CN1, the initial pre-fault average IP traffic dropped was: 0.0516 
packets/sec, which was the average IP datagrams dropped by all nodes in the 
network (Sethi & Hnatyshin, 2013). A fault was applied at link L13 between 
routers R1 and R3 at time 540 sec. For RIP, a distance vector routing protocol 
which offered hop count as a routing metric for path selection, the traffic 
was rerouted through a redundant path (if it existed). By default, the routing 
updates are broad-casted or multi-casted every 30 sec, with a maximum of 15 
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routing) (CAN, 2016). In general, the rerouting time is dependent on the routing 
protocol in use. Here, both networks that were analyzed, were configured with 
the same routing protocols, (i.e., RIP). After rerouting the traffic through a 
redundant path, (i.e. for the traffic communicated among LANs: LAN1, LAN2, 
and LAN3 and the servers/workstations, the traffic was rerouted through R1 ↔ 
R2 ↔ R3), the average IP traffic dropped converges to post-fault steady state of 
0.3269 packets/sec. The total IP traffic sent was 39975.6 packets/sec, and the 
corresponding Level-of-Stability-Reduction (LoSR), was given by 0.7×10
-3%. If 
a second fault was applied at link L23 between routers R2 and R3 at time 3600 sec, 
then, traffic communicated among the LANs, LAN1, LAN2, LAN3, and LAN4 and 
the servers, had no redundant path to be rerouted through. Hence, the average 
IP traffic dropped grew unbounded as shown in Figure 2 and the network was 
no longer stable.
The same attack sequence A1 was simulated for the second communication 
network, CN2, shown in Figure 1 (b), where the initial pre-fault average IP traffic 
drop was: 0.0496 packets/sec. A fault was applied at link L13 between routers R1 
and R3 at time 540 sec. Accordingly, the traffic communicated among the LANs, 
LAN2, LAN3 and the servers, was rerouted through R1 ↔ R2 ↔ R3. The post-fault 
steady state IP traffic dropped was 0.2497 packets/sec. The total IP traffic sent 
was 36921.6 packets/sec, and the corresponding Level-of-Stability-Reduction 
(LoSR) was given by 0.5×10
-3%. After that, a second fault was applied at link 
L23 between routers R2 and R3 at time 3600 sec. Then, the traffic communicated 
among the LANs, LAN2, LAN3, LAN4 and the servers, had no redundant path to 
be rerouted through. Hence, the average IP traffic dropped grew unbounded as 
shown in Figure 3 and the network was no longer stable.




Figure 2. CN1 average IP traffic dropped under A1.  
 
Figure 3. CN2 Average IP Traffic Dropped Under A1. 
0.7×10-3%. If a second fault was applied at link L23 between routers R2 and R3 at time 3600 sec, 
then, traffic communicated among the LANs, LAN1, LAN2, LAN3, and LAN4 and the servers, had 
no redundant path to be rerouted through. Hence, the average IP traffic dropped grew 
unbounded as shown in Figure 2 and the network was no longer stable. 
   The same attack sequence A1 was simulated for the second communication network, CN2, 
shown in Figure 1 (b), where the initial pre-fault average IP traffic drop was: 0.0496 
packets/sec. A fault was applied at link L13 between routers R1 and R3 at time 540 sec. 
Accordingly, the traffic communicated among the LANs, LAN2, LAN3 and the servers, was 
rerouted through R1 ↔ R2 ↔ R3. The post-fault steady state IP traffic dropped was 0.2497 
packets/sec. The total IP traffic sent was 36921.6 packets/sec, and the corresponding Level-of-
Stability-Reduction (LoSR) was given by 0.5×10-3%. After that, a second fault was applied at 
link L23 between routers R2 and R3 at time 3600 sec. Then, the traffic communicated among the 
LANs, LAN2, LAN3, LAN4 and the servers, had no redundant path to be rerouted through. Hence, 













Journal of ICT, 17, No. 1 (Jan) 2018, pp: 115–139
Figure 3. CN2 Average IP Traffic Dropped Under A1.
Figure 4. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average email download response time 
under A1. 
The LoPR associated with each mode of configuration was measured by 
the Maximum-Loss-in-Performance (MLiP), following Equation (2), of the 
coressponding latency of the Email, FTP, and Video services. Figure 4 shows 
the Email latency for CN1 and CN2, respectively. It is given by the average 
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the second fault at link L23, only LAN1 was served (connected) with a MLiP 
of 34.63%, whereas for CN1, no LAN is served and with an infinite download 
response time (i.e. LoPR=∞). In this case, the Opnet Modeler marked the same 
data collected at the time step preceding the current infinite (undefined) value 
(Sethi & Hnatyshin, 2013), (i.e. the  value of 0.3455 sec generated at time 
3528 sec was continuosly repeated for the remaining time of simulation as 
shown in red in Figure 4.)
 
Similar observations can be made regarding the FTP latency, which is given 
by the average download response time. LAN1 was configured with Email 
and FTP applications. Hence, under the second fault at link L23, LAN1 was 
served (connected) in CN2, while it was no longer served (connected) in CN1, 
making the eventual LoPR for CN2 = 13.20%, whereas, the eventual LoPR for 
CN1 was infinite (i.e. infinite download response time), and is given by Opnet 
as the data preceding the current infinite (undefined) value, (i.e. the value of 
0.9539 sec was continuously repeated after the second fault, as shown in red 
in Figure 5.)
Figure 5. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average FTP download response time 
under A1.
For Video application, Figure 6 shows the average in packet delay variation 
as a latency parameter for CN1 and CN2 respectively, under A1. It can be seen 
that after the 2nd fault at link L23, both CN1, and CN2 no longer serve the Video 
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   For Video application, Figure 6 shows the average in packet delay variation as a latency 
parameter for CN1 and CN2 respectively, under A1. It can be seen that after the 2nd fault at link 
L23, both CN1, and CN2 no longer serve the Video application, (i.e. both have an infinite delay 
variation, which is given by the Opnet values of 0.0407 for CN1, and 0.0079 for CN2), as 








   Figure 7 shows the average IP convergence duration for CN1 and CN2 respectively, under A1. 
It can be seen that CN2 took less time (7.53 sec on average) to converge as compared to CN1 
(7.69 sec on average). 
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Opnet values of 0.0407 for CN1, and 0.0079 for CN2), as LAN2 and LAN3 are 
not connected to the networks. Hence, LoPR=∞ for both CN1, and CN2.
Figure 6. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average video packet delay variation 
under A1
Figure 7 shows the average IP convergence duration for CN1 and CN2 
respectively, under A1. It can be seen that CN2 took less time (7.53 sec on 
average) to converge as compared to CN1 (7.69 sec on average).
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  Tables 1 and 2 show the data collected for the average Email (respectively, FTP) download 
response time, D. While, Table 3 shows the data for Video packet delay variation, V, of each 
network at t = 540 sec, and t = 3600 sec, respectively, and the eventual LoPR under A1, following 
equation (2). For CN1, the LoPR for the three applications. Email, FTP, and Video was ∞, while 
for CN2, Email LoPR = 34.63%, FTP LoPR = 13.20%, and Video LoPR = ∞. Hence, CN1 had 
higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, CN1 had higher LoSR (0.7×10-3%) as 
opposed to CN2 (0.5×10-3%). In addition, the RT of CN1 was greater than the RT of CN2 , so 





Average Email Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR (%) Under A1 
 
Table 2 
Average Ftp Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR (%) Under A1 
 
A1 D0, t = 
540 sec 
D(L13), t = 
540 sec 
D0, t = 
3600 sec 




 1.1858 1.5230 0.7704 
∞ ∞ 
CN2 0.6863 0.7760 0.5251 0.5944 13.20 
A1 D0, t = 540 
sec 
D(L13), t  = 
540 sec 
D0, t = 
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Figure 7. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average IP conv rgence duration under A1. 
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Tables 1 and 2 show the data collected for the average Email (respectively, 
FTP) download response time, D. While, Table 3 shows the data for Video 
packet delay variation, V, of each network at t = 540 sec, and t = 3600 sec, 
respectively, and the eventual LoPR under A1, following equation (2). For 
CN1, the LoPR for the three applications. Email, FTP, and Video was ∞, while 
for CN2, Email LoPR = 34.63%, FTP LoPR = 13.20%, and Video LoPR = ∞. 
Hence, CN1 had higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, CN1 
had higher LoSR (0.7×10
-3%) as opposed to CN2 (0.5×10
-3%). In addition, the 
RT of CN1 was greater than the RT of CN2 , so LoR(CN2, A1) > LoR(CN1, A1). 
Thus, CN2 was more resilient to attack scenario A1 as compared to CN1.
Table 1
Average Email Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A1
A1 D0, t = 540 
sec







CN1 0.3316 0.4117 0.2504 ∞ ∞
CN2 0.1804 0.2137 0.1608
0.2165 34.63
Table 2
Average Ftp Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A1
A1 D0, t = 540 
sec




D(L23),  t =
3600 sec
LoPR
CN1 1.1858 1.5230 0.7704 ∞ ∞
CN2 0.6863 0.7760 0.5251 0.5944 13.20
Table 3
Average Video Packet Delay Variation, V of Each Network and LoPR (%) 
Under A1
A1 V0, t = 540 sec







CN1 0.1411 0.1556 0.0344 ∞ ∞
CN2 0.0180 0.0265 0.0058 ∞ ∞
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Similarly, under a second attack scenario, A2: L13 → L12, the average IP 
traffic dropped (respectively, Email download response time, FTP download 
response time, and Video packet delay variation) for both CN1 and CN2 as 
shown in Figures 8-12.
Figure 8. CN1 average IP traffic dropped under A2.
Figure 9. CN2 average IP traffic dropped under A2. 10  
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A1 V , t = 
540 sec 
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540 sec 
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Figure 10. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average email download response time 
under A2.
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Figure 10. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average email download response time under A2. 
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Figure 12. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average video packet delay variation 
under A2
 
Figure 13 shows the average IP convergence duration for CN1 and CN2 
respectively, under A2. It is clear that CN2 took less time (7.44 sec on average) 
to converge as compared to CN1 (7.70 sec on average).
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Tables 4 and 5 show the data collected for the average Email (respectively, FTP) download 
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higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, both CN1 and CN2 had the same LoSR 
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Figure 13. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average IP convergence duration under A2. 
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Tables 4 and 5 show the data collected for the average Email (respectively, 
FTP) download response time, D. Table 6 shows the data for Video packet 
delay variation, V, of each network at t = 540 sec, and t = 3600 sec, respectively, 
and the eventual LoPR under A2, following equation (2). For CN1, Email LoPR 
= 36.58%, FTP LoPR = 23.82%, and Video LoPR = ∞. On the other hand, for 
CN2, the Email LoPR = 35.57%, FTP LoPR = 15.61%, and Video LoPR = ∞. 
Hence, CN1 had higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, both 
CN1 and CN2 had the same LoSR (0.7×10
-3%). Also, the RT of CN1 was greater 
than the RT of  CN2, so LoR(CN2, A2) > LoR(CN1, A2).
Table 4
Average Email Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A2
A1 D0, t = 
540 sec







CN1 0.3316 0.4117 0.2504 0.3420 36.58
CN2 0.1804 0.2301 0.1608 0.2180 35.57
Table 5 
Average Ftp Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A2
A1 D0, t = 
540 sec







CN1 1.1858 1.5230 0.7704 0.9539 23.82
CN2 0.6863 0.6897 0.5252 0.6072 15.61
Table 6
Average Video Packet Delay Variation, V of Each Network and LoPR (%) 
Under A2
A1 V0, t = 
540 sec







CN1 0.1411 0.1556 0.0344 ∞ ∞
CN2 0.0180 0.0266 0.0058 ∞ ∞
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A third attack scenario A3, was also simulated, A3: L12 → L23. The average IP 
traffic dropped (respectively, Email download response time, FTP download 
response time, and Video packet delay variation) for both CN1 and CN2 as 
shown in Figures 14-18. 
Figure 14. CN1 average IP traffic dropped under A3.
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Figure 15. CN2 average IP traffic dropped under A3. 
 




Fig.14. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average Email download response time under A3. 
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Figure 16. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average email download response time 
under A3.



















Figure 15. CN2 average IP traffic dropped under A3. 
 


















   Figure 19 shows the average IP convergence duration for CN1 and CN2 respectively, under A3. 
It is clear that CN2 took less time (7.58 sec on average) to converge as compared to CN1 (7.94 
















Figure 17. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average FTP download response time under A3. 
 




Fig. 16. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average Video packet delay variation under A3. 
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Figure 18. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average video packet delay variation 
under A3.
Figure 19 shows the average IP convergence duration for CN1 and CN2 
respectively, under A3. It is clear that CN2 took less time (7.58 sec on average) 
to converge as compared to CN1 (7.94 sec on average).
Figure 19. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average IP convergence duration under 
A3.
Tables 7 and 8 show the data collected for average Email (respectively, FTP) 
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Figure 17. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average FTP download response time under A3. 
 


















   Tables 7 and 8 show the data collected for average Email (respectively, FTP) download 
response time, D. Table 9 shows the data for Video packet delay variation, V, of each network at 
t = 540 sec, and t = 3600 sec, respectively, and the eventual LoPR under A3, following equation 
(2). For CN1, Email LoPR = 26.11%, FTP LoPR = 4.78%, and Video LoPR = 14.83%. On the 
other hand, for CN2, the Email LoPR = 7.50%, FTP LoPR = 1.29%, and Video LoPR = 3.45%. 
Hence, CN1 had higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, both CN1 and CN2 had 
almost the same LoSR (CN1 LoSR = 3.84×10-5%, and CN2 LoSR = 4.55×10-5%). Also, the RT of 
CN1 was greater than the RT of CN2 , so LoR(CN2, A2) > LoR(CN1, A2), implying that topology 





Average Email Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR (%) Under A3 
A3 D0, t = 
540 sec 
D(L12), t = 
540 sec 
D0, t = 
3600 sec 




 0.3316 0.3340 0.2429 
0.2611 26.11 
CN2 0.1804 0.1788 0.1587 0.1706 7.50 
Table 8 
Average Ftp Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR (%) Under A3 
A3 D0, t = 
540 sec 
D(L12), t = 
540 sec 
D0, t = 
3600 sec 




 1.1858 1.3649 0.7682 
0.8049 4.78 









Figure 19. CN1 (respectively, CN2) average IP convergence duration under A3. 
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variation, V, of each network at t = 540 sec, and t = 3600 sec, respectively, and 
the eventual LoPR under A3, following equation (2). For CN1, Email LoPR = 
26.11%, FTP LoPR = 4.78%, and Video LoPR = 14.83%. On the other hand, for 
CN2, the Email LoPR = 7.50%, FTP LoPR = 1.29%, and Video LoPR = 3.45%. 
Hence, CN1 had higher LoPR than CN2 over all applications. Moreover, both 
CN1 and CN2 had almost the same LoSR (CN1 LoSR = 3.84×10
-5%, and CN2 
LoSR = 4.55×10
-5%). Also, the RT of CN1 was greater than the RT of CN2 , so 
LoR(CN2, A2) > LoR(CN1, A2), implying that topology CN2  was more resilient 
as compared to CN1, under the three attack scenarios. 
Table 7
Average Email Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A3
A3 D0, t = 
540 sec







CN1 0.3316 0.3340 0.2429 0.2611 26.11
CN2 0.1804 0.1788 0.1587 0.1706 7.50
Table 8
Average Ftp Download Response Time, D of Each Network (sec) and LoPR 
(%) Under A3
A3 D0, t = 540 
sec







CN1 1.1858 1.3649 0.7682 0.8049 4.78
CN2 0.6863 0.5793 0.5045 0.5110 1.29
Table 9
Average Video Packet Delay Variation, V of Each Network and LoPR (%) 
Under A3
A3 V0, t = 540 
sec







CN1 0.1411 0.1556 0.0344 0.0395 14.83
CN2 0.0180 0.0157 0.0058 0.0060 3.45
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The experimental results show that while both CN1 and CN2 had same users, 
and services, yet, following Definition 3. CN2  was more resilient as compared 
to CN1 under the three attack scenarios, owing to their topological difference. 
Hence a network designer may suggest to use CN2 design as opposed to CN1.
CONCLUSION
In this work, a new measure for comparing Level-of-Resilience (LoR) 
for communication networks was proposed. This measure was based on 
examining Level-of-Stability-Reduction (LoSR), as measured by percentage 
of IP traffic dropped, Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR), as measured 
by percentage of reduction in application Quality-of-Service (QoS) latency 
parameter, and the network Recovery-Time (RT), as measured by convergence 
time, under various attack scenarios. Future work could involve a model-based 
approach for generating such attack scenarios. Examples were illustrated to 
compare the LoR of two different communication network topologies under 
three different attack scenarios. While RIP was implemented here as a routing 
protocol, other dynamic routing protocols such as OSPF and EIGRP could be 
introduced. Each of these protocols has its own routing process and hence, 
may incur different LoR for same topology and attack sequence. It was shown 
that the placement of network resources could affect the network resilience, as 
indicated by the LoR metric. Thus, using this metric, alternate network designs 
could be analyzed and evaluated to achieve a best-case resilience utilizing the 
given set of resources (of nodes and connectivity).
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, the modeling data for the communication networks CN1 and 
CN2 that were used as running examples are provided.
Table 10
Applications Configuration for both CN1 and CN2
Traffic type Supported 





























Node Models in Use for Both CN1 and CN2
Nodes Model
3 routers (with RIP protocol) Eathernet_4_slip8_gtwy node
4 LANs 10BaseT_LAN
1 Internet (IP) ip32_cloud
2 servers (FTP, Email) Ethernet_server
1 video workstation Ethernet_wkstn
Table 12
Link Models in Use for Both CN1 and CN2
Nodes Model Bandwidth
Among routers; to IP and Email PPP_DS1 1.544 Mbps
Other links Ethernet 10baseT 10Mbps
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